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LIMITING THE WEINGARTEN RIGHT IN THE
NONUNION SETTING: THE
IMPLICATIONS OF SEARS,
ROEBUCK AND CO.
The National Labor Relations Act' was enacted fifty years ago to promote
the free flow of commerce "by removing certain recognized sources of indus-
trial strife and unrest."2 To achieve this goal, the Act seeks to end inequality
in employer and employee relations by encouraging the practice of collective
bargaining and by protecting employee rights to organize and freely associ-
ate.3 Section 7 of the Act grants employees the right to engage in "concerted
activities for the purpose of . . .mutual aid or protection." 4 In general,
protected concerted activity involves activity that is peacefully pursued by
1. Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982)).
For a discussion of the origin and development of the National Labor Relations Act, see gener-
ally A. Cox, LAW AND THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 8-19 (1960); W. GOULD, A PRIMER
ON AMERICAN LABOR LAW 31-50 (1982); 1 ABA SECTION OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
LAW, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 3-48 (C. Morris 2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW]; C. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS, LABOR RELATIONS,
LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880-1960, 99-316 (1985).
2. National Labor Relations Act § 1 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982)).
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize
and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or interrup-
tion, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized sources of
industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly
adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or
other working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining power between
employers and employees.
Id.
3. Id. The preamble of the Act states:
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain
substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate
these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and proce-
dure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full free-
dom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own
choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employ-
ment or other mutual aid or protection.
National Labor Relations Act § 1 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982)).
4. Section 7 provides that "[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection." National Labor Relations Act § 7 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 157 (1982)).
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employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights.5 Until recently it ap-
peared that the protection afforded by section 7 applied equally to unionized
and nonunionized employees.
6
In 1975, the United States Supreme Court found in NLRB v. J. Wein-
garten, Inc., 7 that an employee's right to engage in protected concerted ac-
tivity included the right to have union representation at an investigatory
5. See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 1, at 136. Examples of protected
activity include economic or sympathy strikes and other activity "in resistance or opposition to
the union's leadership." Id.
However, if a collective bargaining agreement contains a no-strike clause, then a violation of
such a clause will render the employees' activity unprotected, provided the employer has not
engaged in unfair labor practices. See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 278-84
(1956).
Moreover, other activities, although concerted in nature, may be unprotected if they are
"unlawful, violent, or in breach of contract." NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S.
9, 17 (1962) (footnotes omitted); see also NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, 465 U.S. 822, 837
(1984) (concerted activity conducted in "an abusive manner" loses § 7 protection).
6. This concept was first set forth in Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. at 14-15,
where the employer discharged nonunion employees who walked off the job in protest of poor
working conditions. The Court found that the employer violated the Act by interfering with
the employees' § 7 right to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid or protection; see also
Vic Tanny Int'l v. NLRB, 622 F.2d 237, 241 (6th Cir. 1980) (unorganized employees who
jointly staged a walkout to present work-related grievances held to be protected since "Con-
gress ... clearly intended to protect not only concerted activity under the sanction of a labor
union, but also concerted activity of the same nature engaged in by unorganized employees");
Keokuk Gas Serv. Co. v, NLRB, 580 F.2d 328, 333 (8th Cir. 1978) (employee's threat to file a
grievance in protest of his punishment was protected concerted activity under § 7 despite the
absence of a collective bargaining agreement); Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v.
NLRB, 547 F.2d 575, 592 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (when employer denied employee's request for
union representation where no collective bargaining agreement or grievance procedure was
present, the court, citing the Weingarten dissent, noted that § 7 protects an employee's right to
engage in concerted activity and not simply the right to engage in such activity with a recog-
nized union), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 966 (1977); NLRB v. Columbia Univ., 541 F.2d 922, 931
n.5 (2d Cir. 1976) (where employer called an interview with an employee after a completed
investigation and for the sole purpose of discharging the employee, although Weingarten was
not dispositive, the court did hold that the representative right was applicable to a nonunion-
ized setting); Materials Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 1010, 1012 (1982) (where unorganized
employee was denied a witness at an investigatory interview, the Board found that "the protec-
tion afforded by Section 7 does not vary depending on whether or not the employees involved
are represented by a union, or whether the conduct involved is related, directly or indirectly, to
union activity or collective bargaining").
7. 420 U.S. 251 (1975). In Weingarten, an employee at one of the employer's retail
stores was called in for an interview with the store manager and confronted with alleged
charges of theft. During the interview, the employee made several requests that her union
steward be present. These requests, however, were denied by the employer. Following the
interview, the employee told union representatives about the employer's actions and the union
subsequently filed charges alleging that the employer committed an unfair labor practice. Id.
at 254-56. See also International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Quality Mfg. Co., 420
U.S. 276 (1975) (a companion case to Weingarten).
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interview.' The Court determined that an employer who denies an employee
this right violates section 8(a)(1) 9 of the Act by interfering with the em-
ployee's exercise of a section 7 right."° The Court based its decision on the
finding that union representation not only safeguards the interests of the in-
dividual employee but also protects the interests of the entire bargaining unit
by preventing the employer from unjustly imposing punishment."
Weingarten, however, left many questions unanswered, one of which was
whether section 7 affords unorganized employees the same representational
right enjoyed by their union counterparts. In 1982, the National Labor Re-
8. 420 U.S. at 260-61. See also Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 197, 199 (1972), enforce-
ment denied in part, 481 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1973), rev'd in part, 420 U.S. 276 (1975), where
the Board stated:
We would not apply the rule to such run-of-the-mill shop-floor conversation as, for
example, the giving of instructions or training or needed corrections of work tech-
niques. In such cases there cannot normally be any reasonable basis for an employee
to fear that any adverse impact may result from the interview, and thus we would
then see no reasonable basis for him to seek the assistance of his representative.
9. The Act is separated into several sections. When an employer commits an unfair
labor practice, it violates § 8(a). In particular, § 8(a)(1) prohibits an employer from interfering
with the exercise of rights by employees which are guaranteed under § 7. This provision is
very broad and an employer violates it when he commits other unfair labor practices. As a
result, whenever there is a violation of § 8(a)(2), (3), (4), or (5), a violation of § 8(a)(1) is also
committed.
Section 8(a)(2) makes it unlawful for an employer to dominate or interfere with a labor
organization or in any way provide illegal assistance or support to the union. An employer is
said to have dominated the formation of the union when it appears to be the true bargaining
representative for unit employees.
A § 8(a)(3) unfair labor practice is committed when an employer discriminates against em-
ployees on terms and conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage union
membership. Likewise, discrimination for NLRB activity is prohibited by § 8(a)(4).
The last section involving employer violations is § 8(a)(5) which makes it illegal for an em-
ployer to refuse to bargain collectively with representatives selected by the majority of employ-
ees over terms and conditions of employment. To prove a § 8(a)(5) violation, a bargaining
representative must show that the unit is appropriate and has been selected by a majority of
employees and that there has been a demand that the employer bargain and the employer has
refused to comply. This duty to bargain also prohibits the employer from taking unilateral
action on mandatory bargaining subjects and from changing terms or conditions of employ-
ment without consulting the union. See National Labor Relations Act § 8 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982)). See generally NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, A
GUIDE TO BASIC LAW AND PROCEDURE UNDER THE NATIONAL ACT 19-28 (1978).
10. 420 U.S. at 256, 260. See also Mobil Oil Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 1052 (1972) ("An em-
ployee's right to union representation is based on Section 7 of the Act which guarantees the
right of employees to act in concert for 'mutual aid and protection.' "), enforcement denied,
482 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1973).
11. 420 U.S. at 260-61. The Court further noted, "[t]his is true even though the employee
alone may have an immediate stake in the outcome .... The union representative whose
participation he seeks is, however, safeguarding not only the particular employee's interest, but
also the interests of the entire bargaining unit .... " Id.
1986] 1035
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lations Board addressed this specific issue in Materials Research Corp., 12 and
held that the right to have a representative present at an investigatory inter-
view flows from an employee's section 7 rights and thus applies equally to
union and nonunion employees. 3
Just three years later the Board reversed itself and overruled Materials
Research in Sears, Roebuck and Co., 4 concluding that the right to represen-
tation during investigatory interviews does not exist where there is no certi-
fied or recognized union. 5 In Sears, employee Larry Ward was suspected of
falsifying company records 16 and was called to the store manager's office to
discuss the alleged misconduct.' 7 Realizing it was a disciplinary interview,
Ward requested that his union representative or a fellow employee be pres-
ent.' 8 His request was refused and, following the interview, Ward was
fired. '9
In a nearly unanimous opinion,2° the Board found that at the time of his
interview, Ward was not represented by a recognized or certified union and
therefore was not entitled to have a representative accompany him to the
meeting.2' The Board based its decision on the distinction between a union
12. 262 N.L.R.B. 1010, 1014 (1982) ("the rationale enunciated in Weingarten compels the
conclusion that unrepresented employees are entitled to the presence of a co-worker at an
investigatory interview"). See also Interstate Sec. Servs., 263 N.L.R.B. 6 (1982).
13. 262 N.L.R.B. at 1010.
14. 274 N.L.R.B. No. 55, 118 L.R.R.M. 1329 (Feb. 22, 1985).
15. Id. The Board found that "[w]hen no union is present ... the imposition of Wein-
garten rights upon employee interviews wrecks havoc with fundamental provisions of the Act
... because the converse of the rule that forbids individual dealing when a union is present is
the rule that, when no union is present, an employer is entirely free to deal with its employees
on an individual, group, or wholesale basis." Id. at 1330.
16. 274 N.L.R.B. No. 55, at 35.
17. Id. at 41.
18. Id. at 36. In Sears, the International Union of Electrical Workers (IUE) had been
conducting and organizing a campaign at the company's service center through union agent
Edward Gaskill. When Ward made his request at the investigatory interview he asked that
Gaskill, his "union representative," be present. The administrative law judge commented in
his decision that it was difficult to see how Gaskill's presence would have changed the situation
since Gaskill was not the bargaining representative of the employees and had no bargaining
authority or contract machinery to invoke.
Additionally, the judge found no evidence that Gaskill was on the premises and available to
attend the interview. As the judge stated, "an employer is not required to unduly delay a
disciplinary or investigatory interview because of the unavailability of an employee's represen-
tative." Id. at 44-46.
19. Id. at 35-36.
20. Chairman Dotson and Member Dennis voted in the majority while Member Hunter
wrote a concurring opinion. At the time of the decision, there were three members, including
the chairman, on the Board.
21. 274 N.L.R.B. No. 55, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1329.
1036 [Vol. 35:1033
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and nonunion setting.2 2 Unlike the Materials Research majority, the Board
found that section 7 protection varied depending on an employee's represen-
tational status and that the rights of one group could not automatically be
transferred to the other.2 3 According to Chairman Dotson and Member
Dennis, the Weingarten rule in a unionized setting is appropriate because it
"meshes comfortably" with labor policy24 and, in particular, with section 9
of the Act.25 However, they maintained that in a nonunion setting allowing
a Weingarten representative would force the employer to afford the group
the status of a labor organization in contravention of the Act's exclusivity
principle.26
Member Hunter, who dissented in Materials Research,2 7 concurred in
Sears noting that while it may be permissible to extend Weingarten rights to
unrepresented employees, this could not be done under a reasonable inter-
pretation of section 7.28 However, Hunter disagreed with the majority's reli-
22. 118 L.R.R.M. at 1329-30. Although the Board agreed with the administrative law
judge's dismissal of Ward's complaint, it rejected the rationale set forth by the judge. In his
decision, the judge found that the interview was held solely to inform Ward of predetermined
discipline and thus the Weingarten right to representation did not apply. Id. at 1329 (citing
Texaco, 246 N.L.R.B. 1021 (1979) and Baton Rouge Water Works Co., 246 N.L.R.B. 995
(1979)). The judge noted, however, that had Ward asked for a witness to accompany him as
distinguished from a union representative it would have been difficult to see how this request
could have been denied. See 274 N.L.R.B. No. 55, at 44-45.
23. 118 L.R.R.M. at 1330. In reaching this conclusion, the Board rejected the rationale of
the majority in Materials Research that Weingarten was based on § 7 and applied equally to
union and nonunion workers. Member Dennis found that § 7 does not protect a nonunion
employee who refuses to participate in an investigatory interview without a fellow employee
"witness" being present. However, she stressed that the employee does engage in protected
concerted activity by requesting the assistance of a coworker. Relying on Meyers Industries,
268 N.L.R.B. 493, 497 (1984), Dennis perceived the employee's request for a coworker witness
as "an attempt to initiate concerted activity because, if successful, two employees would to-
gether confront the employer as it considered whether to impose discipline." Nevertheless,
Chairman Dotson found it unnecessary to decide this issue. 118 L.R.R.M. at 1330 n.8.
24. 118 L.R.R.M. at 1330.
25. Id. See National Labor Relations Act § 9 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 159
(1982)). Under § 8 of the Act, it is unlawful for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively
with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of Section 9(a)." National
Labor Relations Act § 8(5) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982)).
26. 118 L.R.R.M. at 1330. The Board found that the Weingarten representative "acts as
a representative for the employee being interviewed and all other employees in the unit." It
reasoned that the representative's participation in the interview amounted to "dealing with"
the employer which is a "primary indicium of labor organization status as well as a traditional
union function." Id. at 1331.
27. 262 N.L.R.B. at 1021-22.
28. 118 L.R.R.M. at 1332-33. In response to the majority's view, Member Hunter noted
that the Supreme Court in Weingarten gave considerable deference to the Board's interpreta-
tion of § 7 as evidenced by its conclusion that the right to representation was permissible but
not required under the Act. Hunter rejected the Materials Research majority's view that
Weingarten compelled the same construction of § 7 in a nonunion setting. However, Hunter
1986] 1037
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ance on section 9.29 He noted that in the Weingarten setting the employer
has no duty to bargain with the representative and that section 9 is, there-
fore, inapplicable in this situation.3 °
This Note will examine the general protections of section 7. It will discuss
the scope of these protections as defined in Weingarten and explore how
section 7 has been applied in the nonunion setting with particular attention
to the Board's decision in Materials Research. An analysis of Sears will then
follow with a discussion of the Board's reliance on section 931 to support its
decision. Finally, this Note will conclude that national labor policy necessi-
tates the overruling of Sears and the application of Weingarten rights to non-
union employees in a disciplinary setting.
I. THE MEANING OF CONCERTED ACTIVITY
While Congress has never clearly defined concerted activity, an employee
must be engaged in "concerted activity for collective bargaining or other
mutual aid and protection," in order for his conduct to fall within the ambit
of section 7 of the Act.32 Although it has long been established that the
collective conduct of several employees is concerted activity,33 a problem
arises in the interpretation of concerted activity with regard to a lone em-
also disputed the Board majority's assertion in Sears that the Act compelled no Weingarten
rights for unorganized workers. According to Hunter, both views are errojieous in light of the
Court's limitations in reviewing the Board's interpretation of § 7. Id.
Chairman Dotson and Member Dennis noted that their major difference with Member
Hunter was that he appeared to view their decision in Sears as a permissible interpretation of
the Act, while they viewed the result as "one the Act compels." Id. at 1329 n.5.
29. Id. at 1333. In particular, Hunter rejected the majority's reliance on Emporium Cap-
well v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975), discussed infra note 148 and
accompanying text.
30. 118 L.R.R.M. at 1332.
31. The relevant portion of § 9 states that "[r]epresentatives designated or selected for the
purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for
such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit." Na-
tional Labor Relations Act § 9(a) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982)).
32. National Labor Relations Act § 7 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982)).
The relevant portion states "[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection."
Section 8 provides that "[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-(1) [t]o inter-
fere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7."
National Labor Relations Act § 8(1) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982)).
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
33. See Washington Aluminum, 370 U.S. at 14-17. Upholding the Board's decision, the
Supreme Court found that the employees' walkout represented concerted activity that was
clearly protected under § 7. Id. at 12-13. See supra note 6 for a discussion of Washington
Aluminum.
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ployee.3 4 Some Board and court decisions have strictly interpreted con-
certed activity to require more than one employee.35 Others have
determined that in certain circumstances a single employee's actions may be
protected under section 7.36
However, the circumstances which render individual activity concerted
and protected under section 7 vary. For example, one approach adopts a
narrow interpretation of section 7 and finds an individual's activity con-
certed only if he acts as a representative of other employees.3 7 Under a
34. See generally Gorman & Finkin, The Individual and the Requirement of "Concert"
Under the National Labor Relations Act, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 286 (1981); Note, Protection of
Individual Action as "Concerted Activity" Under the National Labor Relations Act, 68 COR-
NELL L. REV. 369 (1983).
35. See, e.g., Ontario Knife Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 840, 844 (2d. Cir. 1980) ("by defini-
tion, an individual acting alone cannot act in concert"); Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v.
NLRB, 635 F.2d 304, 306 (4th Cir. 1980) (" '[c]oncerted activity' under the statute, read liter-
ally, would appear to require more than a single participant").
36. See, e.g., Royal Dev. Co. v. NLRB, 703 F.2d 363, 372 (9th Cir. 1983) (employee's
actions are considered concerted only when he acts collectively or on behalf of other employ-
ees); ARO, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 713, 718 (6th Cir. 1979) ("[flor an individual claim or
complaint to amount to concerted action under the Act it must not have been made solely on
behalf of an individual employee, but it must be made on behalf of other employees"); Mush-
room Trans. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964) (an individual's conversations
with fellow employees was protected activity only if it aimed at initiating or invoking group
action, and "mere 'griping' " would not be considered concerted activity if it "looks forward to
no action at all"); NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskinghum Elec. Coop., 285 F.2d 8, 12-13 (6th Cir.
1960) (employee must be acting in behalf of other employees and not merely for the benefit of
employees in the theoretical sense); Ontario Knife Co., 247 N.L.R.B. 1288, 1289 ("individual
protest was protected because it involved a group concern" over the violation of a statutory
right afforded to the entire unit), enforcement denied, 637 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1980); Steere
Dairy, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 1350, 1351 (1978) (holding that an employee who walked off the job
to protest a change in terms of employment and work conditions was engaging in protected
concerted activity despite the refusal of the other employees to join in); Alleluia Cushion Co.,
221 N.L.R.B. 999, 1000 (1975) (holding an individual's actions to be concerted in the limited
context of protesting unsafe work conditions).
37. See, e.g., Blaw-Knox Foundry & Mill Mach., Inc. v. NLRB, 646 F.2d 113, 116 (4th
Cir. 1981) (employees' protests alleging sexual harassment against his relative was a personal
concern and thereby held not to be concerted activity); Ontario Knife Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d
at 845 (employee walking off the job alone to protest a work assignment was not concerted
activity because other employees did not participate in or approve of the action); Krispy
Kreme, 635 F.2d at 306-08 (actions by a single employee who continued to file workman's
compensation claims were not concerted activity since he did not intend to advance group
activity); Pelton Casteel, Inc. v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 23, 28-29 (7th Cir. 1980) (employee com-
plaining about job rates and overtime was engaged in concerted activity but evidence was
insufficient to support a finding that employee's discharge was motivated by the activity);
ARO, Inc., 596 F.2d at 718 (where the court concluded that an individual's activity is con-
certed only if it is made on behalf of other employees or with the objective of inducing some
group action); Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 544 F.2d 320, 328 (7th Cir. 1976) (em-
ployee acting alone in distributing leaflets directed toward inadequate supervision in areas of
safety and discipline seen to have a purpose protected under § 7); NLRB v. Buddies Supermar-
1986] 1039
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broader standard, adopted by the Third Circuit in Mushroom Transportation
v. NLRB, 38 an employee's conversation can be concerted activity if its pur-
pose is to induce or prepare for group action, and is in the interest of all
employees. 39 Therefore, under the Mushroom Transportation standard, an
individual employee's communication with other employees is protected if it
is more than "mere griping" and appears to promote some kind of group
action.4" The Mushroom Transportation standard has been followed by
many courts4' although recent Board and court decisions have not relied
upon it in addressing the issue of whether a nonunion employee's request for
Weingarten representation is concerted activity.42
A fundamental case in which the court established the concept of "con-
structive concerted activity"43 was Interboro Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB.4
kets, 481 F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 1973) (milk salesman's efforts to gain more favorable contract
terms for himself not seen as inviting others to join him in his protests); Hugh H. Wilson Corp.
v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1345, 1352 (3d Cir. 1969) (employee's protest of company's profit-sharing
plan constituted sufficient group action), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 35 (1970); Owens-Corning Fi-
berglas Corp. v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 1357, 1365 (4th Cir. 1969) (two employees' involvement in
circulating a petition protesting inadequate working conditions construed as concerted activ-
ity); Indiana Gear Works v. NLRB, 371 F.2d 273, 276 (7th Cir. 1967) (employee complaining
about two-cent an hour increase not protected in absence of any evidence that he was acting to
induce group action).
38. 330 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1964). In Mushroom Transportation, a part-time driver, not
covered by the bargaining agreement, was alleged to have frequently discussed terms and con-
ditions of employment with employees and to have offered his advice to them on these matters.
Although the conversations concerned the rights of the individual employees, the court deter-
mined that these conversations were not protected under § 7 of the Act because there was no
indication of contemplated group activity. Id. at 684-85.
39. Id. at 685 ("mere talk" could be concerted activity if it appeared "that it was engaged
in with the object of initiating ... or preparing for group action or that it had some relation to
group action in the interest of the employees").
40. Id.
41. See Hugh H. Wilson Corp., 414 F.2d at 1348 (" 'Mere griping' about a condition of
employment is not protected, but when the 'griping' coalesces with expression inclined to pro-
duce group or representation action, the statute protects the activity." (quoting Mushroom
Transportation, 330 F.2d at 685)). See also Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 407 F.2d at 1365
("The activity of a single employee in enlisting the support of his fellow employees for their
mutual aid and protection is as much 'concerted activity' as is ordinary group activity. The
one seldom exists without the other.").
42. See Materials Research, 262 N.L.R.B. at 1011-13; E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
NLRB, 724 F.2d 1061, 1065-67 (1983), vacated, 733 F.2d 296 (3d Cir. 1984); E.I. Du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. NLRB, 707 F.2d 1076, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 1983).
43. For a discussion of the concept of "constructive concerted activity" first introduced in
Interboro Contractors, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 1295 (1966), and subsequently adopted by the Sec-
ond Circuit in Interboro Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB, 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967), see generally
Comment, Constructive Concerted Activity and Individual Rights: The Northern Metal-In-
terboro Split, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 152 (1972); see also Wilson, The Supreme Court Takes One
Step Forward and the NLRB Takes One Step Backward: Redefining Constructive Concerted
Activities, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1295 (1985).
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Under the Interboro doctrine, a single employee acting alone is protected
under section 7 if the employee is attempting to enforce provisions of an
existing collective bargaining agreement.4 5 Moreover, even without a show-
ing of support on the part of other employees, the court determined that an
individual's actions could still be concerted activity if they involved an at-
tempt to enforce contract provisions.4 6 The rationale underlying the concept
of "constructive concerted activity" is that an employee's attempts to en-
force collective bargaining provisions are an extension of the concerted activ-
ity which produced the contract and that, as such, the employee's actions
affect the rights of all employees in the bargaining unit.
The Interboro doctrine was later extended in Alleluia Cushion Co. to in-
clude situations in which no collective bargaining agreement existed.48 In
Alleluia, the Board held that "constructive concerted activity" was involved
where a nonunion employee filed a safety complaint with the State Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).4 9 Acknowledging that
the employee acted alone, the Board nevertheless found the employee's ac-
tivity to be protected, even in the absence of either a collective bargaining
agreement or any evidence of support from other employees.5" The Board
noted that safety in the workplace is a concern of all employees and that an
employee's assertion of his rights under state health and safety laws carried
with it the "implied consent" of his fellow workers.5  The Alleluia rationale
thus appeared to be based on two principles: an individual's activity is pre-
sumed to be concerted when it relates to an issue of mutual concern and is
asserted under a statute enacted for the benefit of employees.52
44. 388 F.2d 495, 499-500 (2d Cir. 1968). In Interboro, two employees were discharged
following their repeated complaints about contract violations. The court found that the em-
ployees' complaints were for a legitimate concerted purpose. Additionally, it dismissed allega-
tions that one of the employees was acting for personal benefit stating that even if there was no
showing of support by fellow workers, an employee's actions would be concerted if they in-
volved attempts to enforce provisions of the contract. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 501. Relying on the Board's decision, the court noted that "the Board need not
find the complaints to be meritorious in order to hold the activity protected." Id. at 500.
47. See id. at 500.
48. 221 N.L.R.B. 999, 1000 (1975). But see NLRB v. Bighorn Beverage, 614 F.2d 1238,
1242 (9th Cir. 1980) (where the court, relying on a pre-Alleluia decision, NLRB v. C & I Air
Conditioning, Inc., 486 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1973), refused to extend Interboro in the absence of
a collective bargaining agreement); NLRB v. Dawson Cabinet Co., 566 F.2d 1079, 1084 (8th
Cir. 1977) (although agreeing with Interboro, the court found it distinguishable in the context
of a nonunion setting).
49. 221 N.L.R.B. at 1000-01.
50. Id. at 1000. The Board found that "consent and concert of action emanates from the
mere assertion" of the rights under the state health and safety laws. Id.
51. Id.
52. See Meyers Indus., 268 N.L.R.B. 493,499-500 (1984) (Zimmerman, Member, dissent-
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Nine years later in Meyers Industries, 13 the Board overruled Alleluia and
formulated a new "objective standard" for concerted activity. In Meyers,
the Board held that an employee in a nonunion plant was lawfully dis-
charged when he refused to drive an allegedly malfunctioning truck and
later complained to state authorities about the unsafe condition of the vehi-
cle.54 Although the state subsequently determined that the truck was faulty,
the Board held that the employee's activity required evidence of collective
interaction in order to gain protection under the Act." Accordingly, under
the Meyers test, an employee's activity is concerted if it is engaged in with
the participation or approval of other employees, and not by a lone employee
acting in his own self-interest.5 6
However, the strict interpretation of concerted activities enunciated in
Meyers was recently questioned in Prill v. NLRB, 57 where the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia concluded that neither the
Board's "objective test" nor its rejection of Alleluia were required by the
language of the Act.5 8 The court reversed Meyers in light of the Supreme
Court's opinion in NLRB v. City Disposal Systems59 where the Court reaf-
firmed the Board's broad power to define the boundaries of the section 7
concerted activity requirement.6 °
The facts in City Disposal were very similar to Meyers except that the
employee was in a unionized setting. 61  In a five-to-four decision, the
ing), remanded sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
313, 352 (1985).
53. 268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1984).
54. Id. at 498.
55. Id. at 497.
56. Id. The Board cautioned that its definition of concerted activity was not a "compre-
hensive" or "exhaustive" one. Moreover, it noted that the question of whether an employee's
conduct is concerted activity is a factual determination dependent on the particular circum-
stances of each case. Id. at 496-97.
57. 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 313, 352 (1985).
58. Id. at 956-57. The Prill court gave two reasons for its decision. First, the court found
that the Board erred in concluding that the Act mandated its narrow definition of concerted
activities. In particular, the court found that City Disposal, 465 U.S. 822 (1984), "makes clear
that the Board is not required to give a narrowly literal interpretation to 'concerted activities'
but has substantial authority to 'define' the scope of § 7." Prill, 755 F.2d at 956. Second, the
court found that the Meyers test was not a return to pre-Alleluia concerted activities standards,
as the Board had declared, but it was in fact a more restrictive standard. Id. at 956-57.
59. 465 U.S. 822 (1984). For a comparison of City Disposal and Meyers see Berthel, Con-
tructive Concerted Activity Under the NLRA: Conflicting Signals from the Court and the
Board, 59 Ind. L. J. 583 (1984); see also Wilson, supra note 43, at 1295.
60. 465 U.S. at 829.
61. Id. at 824-25. In City Disposal, an employee was discharged after he refused to drive a
vehicle which he alleged was unsafe. Under Article XXI of the contract between the employer
and Teamsters Local 247, "[t]he Employer shall not require employees to take out on the
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Supreme Court held that a lone employee who invokes a right derived from
a collective bargaining agreement is engaged in concerted activity. 62 Addi-
tionally, relying on the Interboro doctrine, the Court found that the em-
ployee's assertion of this right affects the rights of all workers covered by the
labor contract. 63 The Supreme Court explained that "concerted" need not
be read literally. 4 Rather, in light of its expertise in the labor field, the
Board should exercise its discretion and construe the term to best effectuate
the policies of the Act.65 The Court further stated that Congress did not
intend to limit the protection extended to individual employees based on the
way in which the employee's activity combined with that of his fellow work-
ers.66 Instead, it concluded that Congress enacted section 7 to equalize the
bargaining power between the employee and the employer by allowing em-
ployees to confront collectively the employer on terms and conditions of em-
ployment. 67 Thus, the Court reasoned, an individual employee is protected,
even when acting alone, if the employee is participating "in an integral as-
pect of ... the entire process of labor organizing, collective bargaining, and
enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.,
68
Accordingly, in relation to City Disposal, the Meyers test appears too re-
strictive since an employee may participate in an "integral" part of the col-
lective process without the authority of other employees. 69 Nevertheless, the
City Disposal majority noted that Meyers was distinguishable because it in-
streets or highways any vehicle that is not in safe operating condition . . . . It shall be a
violation of the Agreement where employees refuse to operate such equipment unless such
refusal is unjustified." Id. The Court noted that while the employee complained about the
questionable safety of the vehicle he did not explicitly refer to Article XXI of the contract. Id.
at 827.
62. Id. at 824-41. The Court reasoned that the act of organizing and joining a union was
itself a collective action and that, as such, an employee's invocation of a right derived from the
collective bargaining agreement is concerted activity. The Court found that the Interboro doc-
trine compelled the conclusion that an honest assertion of a contractual right was concerted
activity despite the fact that the employee may have been wrong in his belief that a right had
been violated. Id. at 840.
63. Id. at 829.
64. Id. at 831. Reversing a Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, the Supreme Court
reasoned that "[a]lthough one could interpret the phrase, 'to engage in concerted activities,' to
refer to a situation in which two or more employees are working together at the same time and
the same place toward a common goal, the language of § 7 does not confine itself to such a
narrow meaning." Id.
65. Id. at 829-30.
66. Id. While not addressing specifically the § 7 rights of an unorganized employee, the
Court did state that Congress intended to protect individual employees participating in the
collective bargaining process, although this term was not clearly defined by the Court. Id.
67. Id. at 835.
68. Id.
69. According to the Prill court, "City Disposal makes it unmistakably clear that, contrary
to the Board's view in Meyers, neither the language nor the history of section 7 requires that
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volved a nonunion workplace and, thus, the "constructive concerted activ-
ity" theory established was inapplicable.7" Consequently, until the effect of
the Prill decision is more clearly determined, the concept of concerted activ-
ity remains a source of controversy.
II. THE SCOPE AND APPLICATION OF SECTION 7
Employee activity falls within the scope of section 7 protection if it is
concerted in nature and pursued either "for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection., 7  Despite this language, the
scope of section 7 protection remains undefined in many circumstances.
Although the dividing line between protected and unprotected employee ac-
tion has not been drawn precisely, it appears that the predominant concern
of the Board and courts is to maintain equality in the bargaining relationship
between the employer and the employee. 72 What has emerged is the impli-
cation that this goal should prevail over distinctions based on employees'
representational status.
A. Development of the Weingarten Right in a Unionized Setting
In NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., the Supreme Court held that an em-
ployee's request for union representation at a confrontation with the em-
ployer satisfied the concerted activity and mutual aid requirements of section
7.73 Initially, the Board found that the employer violated section 8(a)(1) of
the Act 74 by denying the employee's request for union representation be-
cause it interfered with the individual employee's exercise of section 7
rights.75 The Supreme Court upheld the Board's ruling as a permissible con-
struction of "concerted activities for ... mutual aid or protection., 76 More-
over, the Court concluded that the employee's action in seeking the
the term 'concerted activities' be interpreted to protect only the most narrowly defined forms
of common action by employees ...." 755 F.2d at 952.
70. 465 U.S. at 829 n.6; see also Meyers, 268 N.L.R.B. at 496 n.21, where the Board noted
that City Disposal was pending before the Supreme Court.
71. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
72. See City Disposal, 465 U.S. at 835; Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 262. See generally
Gorman & Finkin, supra note 34, at 331-46.
73. 420 U.S. at 260-61. See supra note 7 and accompanying text for the facts of
Weingarten.
74. See 420 U.S. at 252, 257; see also supra notes 9, 32, for a discussion of § 8(a)(1).
75. J. Weingarten, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 446, 450 (1973).
76. 420 U.S. at 260 (quoting NLRB v. Peter Caliler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130
F.2d 503, 505-06 (2d Cir. 1942)). In Weingarten, the Supreme Court defined mutual aid and
protection as the solidarity created when an individual engages in activity with the support of
his fellow workers, who, by joining with the employee, assure themselves of his assistance if
they are ever in like circumstances. Id. at 261.
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assistance of the union representative was within the literal wording of sec-
tion 7 and thus was protected activity. 7 The Court cited two reasons for
affording the employee protection under the Act.78 First, the employee was
seeking protection against what she believed to be a threat to her employ-
ment security. 79 Second, the union representative whose assistance she re-
quested was protecting not only the employee's individual "interests, but
also the interests of the entire bargaining unit."8° Further, the Court found
that the Board's construction of section 7 effectuated "the most fundamental
purpose[s] of the Act"-to eliminate the imbalance in bargaining power be-
tween the employees and the employer.8" Additionally, the Court noted that
requiring a lone employee to attend an interview that he reasonably believes
to be disciplinary could perpetuate the imbalance in bargaining power.82
The Court found, however, that this statutory right to representation was
not absolute, and therefore, set forth several limitations on its holding. 3
First, the Court noted that the employee's right to union representation is
based on section 7 of the Act, which guarantees an employee the right to act
in concert with other employees for mutual aid.84 Second, the right arises
only upon the employee's request for representation and the employee may
waive the right and participate in the interview without union representa-
tion.85 Third, the Court held that the right existed only when the employee
reasonably believes the investigation will result in disciplinary action.86
Fourth, this right may not interfere with legitimate employer prerogatives87
and the employer may refuse to grant the employee's request for union rep-
resentation without offering an explanation.88 This employer action leaves
77. Id. at 260.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 260-61. The Court reasoned that the presence of the representative assured
other employees in the unit that, in like circumstances, they too could obtain the representa-
tive's aid and assistance. Id. at 261.
81. Id. at 261-62.
82. Id. at 262.
83. Id. at 256. In establishing these limitations the Court relied on two Board cases:
Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 197 (1972), enforcement denied in part, 481 F.2d 1018 (4th
Cir. 1973), rev'd in part, 420 U.S. 276 (1975) and Mobil Oil Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 1052 (1972),
enforcement denied, 482 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1973). These opinions, the Court noted, "shaped
the contours and limits" of the employee's statutory right to representation. 420 U.S. at 256.
84. 420 U.S. at 256-57.
85. Id. at 257. It has also been found that an employee's silence can be an effective waiver
of his Weingarten right. Moreover, the right to representation at an investigatory interview
may be contractually waived so long as the waiver is "clear and unmistakable." See Prudential
Ins. Co. of Am. v. NLRB, 661 F.2d 398, 400-01 (5th Cir. 1981).
86. 420 U.S. at 257-58.
87. Id. at 258.
88. Id.
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the employee with the options of either continuing the interview without a
union representative present, or refusing the interview, thereby losing the
benefits that might result.89 Finally, the employer is under no duty to bar-
gain with the union representative who attends the investigatory interview.9 °
In their dissent, Justices Powell and Stewart concluded that the interview
was not concerted within the meaning of the Act.9 In their opinion, the
right to union representation at an investigatory interview was intended by
Congress to be a part of the collective bargaining process,92 and they noted
that many labor agreements include sections that grant and define this
right.93 Additionally, although the dissent did not directly address the issue
of unorganized employees' rights to union representation, it found that the
section 7 right to act "in concert" in employee interviews existed even in the
absence of a recognized union. 4
Decisions following Weingarten have identified several situations in which
the rule can be appropriately applied.95 These decisions, however, have
arisen primarily in an organized setting.96 Until 1982, the issue of whether
89. Id. at 258-59. The Court presented the reasoning from Quality Mfg. Co., 195
N.L.R.B. at 198-99, to explain its point:
This seems to us to be the only course consistent with all of the provisions of our Act.
It permits the employer to reject a collective course in situations such as investigative
interviews where a collective course is not required but protects the employee's right
to protection by his chosen agents.
420 U.S. at 259.
90. 420 U.S. at 259-60; see also Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. NLRB, 667 F.2d 470, 473
(5th Cir. 1982) (employee's right to representation was not violated when the employer refused
to allow the Weingarten representative to interfere with employer's questioning of the
employee).
91. 420 U.S. at 269-70.
92. Id. at 270.
93. Id. at 275.
94. Id. at 270 & n.1.
95. See Certified Grocers, 227 N.L.R.B. 1211 (1977) (Weingarten applies to both investi-
gatory and disciplinary interviews when the employee reasonably believes that discipline may
result), enforcement denied, 587 F.2d 436 (9th Cir. 1978); but see Baton Rouge Water Works
Co., 246 N.L.R.B. 995, 997 (1979) (where the Board partially overruled Certified Grocers by
holding that an employee does not have a § 7 right to union representation in a meeting held
solely to notify the employee of, and act upon, a previously determined disciplinary decision
based on information obtained prior to the meeting); Texaco, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 1021, 1022
(1979) (where the Board expanded on Baton Rouge by holding that an employer's offer to
allow employees an opportunity to explain or defend themselves after they had been advised of
the predetermined discipline did not warrant Weingarten protection).
96. See, e.g., Gulf States Mfg. v. NLRB, 704 F.2d 1390, 1392 (5th Cir. 1983); NLRB v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 676 F.2d 499, 500 (1 1th Cir. 1982); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,
661 F.2d at 399; NLRB v. Texaco, Inc., 659 F.2d 124, 125 (9th Cir. 1981); Lennox Indus. v.
NLRB, 637 F.2d 340, 342 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 963 (1981); Good Hope Refineries,
Inc. v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 57, 58 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1012 (1980).
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Weingarten applied to a nonunion setting was addressed only indirectly.9 7
Nevertheless, the consensus in these circumstances has been that the em-
ployee is entitled to union representation. 98
For example, in Glomac Plastics, Inc., the employee was denied union rep-
resentation by an employer who unlawfully refused to recognize the union as
the employee's collective bargaining agent.99 Interpreting Weingarten
broadly, the Board found that the employee has the right to a certain degree
of protection against an unjust employer regardless of the employee's repre-
sentational status."° Similarly, in Crown Cork & Seal Co., an employer's
refusal to permit a union representative at an employee interview was held
unlawful despite the fact that the union's status was still pending at the ap-
pellate court level.101
Other decisions have expressed in clearer terms the right of nonunion em-
ployees to Weingarten representation.' °2 In NLRB v. Columbia Univer-
sity, 103 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that
Weingarten rights apply equally to unionized and nonunionized workers.' °4
The issue was also addressed by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit in ITT Lighting Fixtures v. NLRB. 105 There, the employer
denied an employee's request for the presence of a fellow employee at an
97. See, e.g., Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. NLRB, 674 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1982) (union member
instead of union official present); Crown Cork & Seal Co., 659 F.2d 127 (10th Cir. 1981) (no
union certification), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1150 (1982); Anchortank, Inc. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d
1153 (5th Cir. 1980) (union not certified); Glomac Plastics, Inc., 600 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1979)
(union certification period extended).
98. Illinois Bell, 674 F.2d at 622 (employee was entitled to coemployee witness with no
official union status as a representative when no union official was working at the time of the
investigatory interview); Anchortank 618 F.2d at 1165 (employee has the right to have a union
representative present at a Weingarten type interview which occurs during the period between
the union's challenged victory in a representation election and its successful certification as the
employees' bargaining representative); Crown Cork & Seal Co., 255 N.L.R.B. 14, 48-49 (1981)
(Weingarten applies where the employer refuses to recognize the union as the employee's bar-
gaining representative), enforced without opinion, 691 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1982); Glomac Plas-
tics, Inc., 234 N.L.R.B. 1309, 1311 (1978) (employee has a right to certain protections against
unjust employer practices whether or not the employee is represented by a union), enforced,
592 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1979); see also ITT Lighting Fixtures v. NLRB, 719 F.2d 851, 854 (6th
Cir. 1983) (Weingarten rule is applicable "when a union has been approved by the vote of the
employees but when a decision on certification is pending.").
99. 234 N.L.R.B. at 1311.
100. Id.
101. 255 N.L.R.B. at 48-49.
102. See, e.g., NLRB v. Columbia Univ., 541 F.2d 922, 931 n.5 (2d Cir. 1976); Anchortank,
618 F.2d at 1157-58; 1TTLighting Fixtures, 719 F.2d at 855-56. See supra note 98 for discus-
sion of Anchortank and ITT Lighting Fixtures.
103. 541 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1976)
104. Id. at 931 n.5.
105. 719 F.2d at 851.
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interview that occurred after the union had been voted in by a majority of
employees but before it was certified.' °6 The court found that the em-
ployee's request was protected under Weingarten even though the fellow em-
ployee could not have been his certified union representative.'o 7 In both of
these cases, the courts relied on the assumption set forth in the Weingarten
dissent that the section 7 right to act "in concert" at employee interviews
exists not only for organized workers but also for employees in an unorgan-
ized setting.108
B. Materials Research: Application of Weingarten
in the Nonunion Setting
The Board directly confronted the issue of whether Weingarten rights
were applicable to unorganized employees in Materials Research Corp. 109
and held that the right to representation at an investigatory interview ex-
tended equally to nonunion workers." 0 The majority reasoned that the
Weingarten Court did not intend to limit section 7 protection based on an
employee's representational status."' The Board noted that in Weingarten
an employee's right to representation stemmed from section 7 and not from
a union's section 9 right to act as the collective bargaining agent. 1 2 It also
indicated that a nonunion employee should be afforded the opportunity to
have a witness present to provide a check against arbitrary or unfair acts by
the employer and to offer moral support." 3 The Board stressed that an em-
ployer has the prerogative to deny an employee's request for representation
at an interview leaving the employee with the choice of continuing the inter-
view unassisted or refusing it and foregoing the benefits that may come as a
106. Id. at 854. But see Anchortank, 618 F.2d at 1161-62. The court concluded that prior
to a representation election an employee's action in seeking union representation at an inter-
view did not satisfy the concerted activity requirement. However, following an election where
the union wins, the situation changes even if the union's victory is challenged. After the union
has won the election, the employer must necessarily perceive the employee's request to be for
the concerted mutual aid and protection of his coworkers. Id.
107. 719 F.2d at 856.
108. 420 U.S. at 270 n.1. See also NLRB v. Columbia Univ., 541 F.2d at 931; ITTLight-
ing Fixtures, 719 F.2d at 855; Glomac Plastics, 234 N.L.R.B. at 1311.
109. 262 N.L.R.B. 1010 (1982).
110. Id. at 1014.
111. Id. at 1012.
112. Id. The Board concluded from this that the right is invoked only if the employee
makes a request for representation because this activates the concerted activity requirement in
§ 7. Id.
113. Id. at 1015. Here the Board reasoned that in the absence of a grievance-arbitration
procedure an employee in a nonunion setting may be more apprehensive than one in a union-
ized facility. Id.
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result.' 14
Then-Chairman Van de Water wrote a dissenting opinion that was later
relied upon by the majority in Sears. 115 According to Van de Water, the
section 7 right does not attach in the absence of a duly recognized union. 116
Rather, he reasoned that as in Weingarten, an established collective bargain-
ing agreement and the obligations thereby created were essential to deter-
mining the parameters of the employee's right to representation.
1 17
Van de Water argued that the question of whether an employee has a right
to representation when no union is present turns on section 9 considera-
tions."' He stressed that in the absence of a union an employer has no
statutory duty to recognize an individual employee or a group of employees
on matters concerning terms and conditions of employment." 9 However,
once the union has been certified, Van de Water reasoned that section 9
requires that the employer deal with the union as the employees' exclusive
bargaining representative. 120 Van de Water also indicated that the Wein-
garten representative is not required to be silent in the interview and thus the
representative's role is "strikingly similar to the role of a labor organization
in its dealings with an employer."'
12 1
Lastly, Van de Water cited Emporium Capwell122 to support his conclu-
sion that the right to engage in concerted activity must, in some situations,
give way when it contravenes rights guaranteed in other provisions of the
114. Id. at 1015-16.
115. See Sears, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1330.
116. 262 N.L.R.B. at 1016. See Van de Water, New Trends in NLRB Law, 33 LAB. L.J.
635, 640 (1982). Former Chairman Van de Water, speaking before the American Bar Associa-
tion, explained his reasons for dissenting in Materials Research. In his view, the Weingarten
rule applies only in an organized setting where there are union representatives that the em-
ployer is obligated to recognize. He noted that while the majority may believe that nonunion
employees need protection, it should not be obtained at the expense of the statutory scheme.
Id.
117. 262 N.L.R.B. at 1018.
118. Id. at 1016.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1016-17. Van de Water reasoned that once the union has been certified as the
employees' exclusive bargaining representative, the employer is no longer free to deal with an
employee on an individual basis. This obligation, according to Van de Water, is imposed by
§§ 9(a), 8(d) and 8(a)(5) of the Act which require the employer "to deal with employees collec-
tively through their exclusive representative on matters concerning the employees' terms and
conditions of employment." In support of his argument, the former Chairman relied on Tex-
aco, Inc., Houston Producing Div., 168 N.L.R.B. 361 (1967), appeal denied, 408 F.2d 142 (5th
Cir. 1969), a pre-Weingarten decision. In Texaco, the Board found that an established collec-
tive bargaining relationship was an essential factor in determining an employee's right to repre-
sentation. 262 N.L.R.B. at 1017 (citing Texaco, 168 N.L.R.B. at 362).
121. 262 N.L.R.B. at 1019.
122. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
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Act. 123 Section 7, he reasoned, affords protection to employees who seek
mutual aid and protection. However, it does not mandate that an employer
accede to the employees' demands in all situations.
1 24
Soon after Materials Research, two courts produced contrary conclusions
on whether a nonemployee's request for the presence of a coworker witness
at an investigatory interview was concerted activity under section 7125 In
E.I. Du Pont de Nemours v. NLRB (Du Pont I), 126 a nonunion employee's
request for a fellow employee to witness a disciplinary meeting with his su-
pervisor was denied by his employer.127 Affirming the administrative law
judge's decision, the Board found that the employer violated the Act by re-
fusing the employee's request. 28
Denying enforcement of the Board's order, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit refused to extend Weingarten to the nonunion
setting in the absence of a showing of concert between the employee and his
fellow workers. 129 The court noted that in Weingarten the assumption of
concert was supported by the fact that the union had been organized
through the collective action of employees and this ensured that concerted
activity would follow an employee's request for assistance. 3° Nevertheless,
the court did not foreclose the possibility that section 7 protection applied
to a single employee's request in an unorganized setting as well.' How-
ever, to meet the requirement of concert there must be a history of group
activity or the implication of future collective action; the latter of which the
123. 262 N.L.R.B. at 1020.
124. Id. at 1020-21. Van de Water stated, "I believe that Section 7 vigilantly protects the
right of employees to seek mutual aid and protection. But I find nothing in the Act which
mandates that an employer must, in all instances, accede to the employees' terms." Id.
125. See E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. NLRB, 707 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1983) [herein-
after cited as Du Pont I]; E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. NLRB, 724 F.2d 1061 (1983),
vacated, 733 F.2d 296 (3d Cir. 1984) [hereinafter cited as Du Pont II].
126. Du Pont 1, 707 F.2d at 1077. In this case, the employer docked employee Henry
Burke's pay in response to Burke's unauthorized visit to his doctor. The following day the
employer summoned Burke and presented him with documents listing his work deficiencies
and the conditions necessary for his continued employment. Burke requested copies of the
document but his employer would not comply with his request. Burke then refused to sign the
forms unless a coworker was present to witness the transaction. The employer denied Burke's
request and subsequently dismissed him. Id.
127. Id.
128. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 262 N.L.R.B. 1040, 1045 (1982).
129. Du Pont I, 707 F.2d at 1078.
130. Id. The court found that the concerted activity requirement could be assumed since
the union had been formed by concerted activity and stood as a guarantee that such activity
would result from a request for help. Id.
131. Id. at 1079 ("[U]nionization is not the only sure indicator of concertedness. There
must, however, be a showing that the requesting employee acts as part of a group.").
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court found to be "wholly speculative" in Du Pont . 132 Additionally,
although acknowledging Materials Research, the court did not comment on
the Board's ruling.
133
In a case decided shortly thereafter, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit reached a different conclusion on whether an unorgan-
ized worker's request for the presence of a coemployee witness at an investi-
gatory interview met the concerted activity requirement of section 7V 34 In
Du Pont de Nemours v. NLRB (Du Pont H1), 13 5 the court enforced the
Board's ruling that Weingarten applied in nonunionized settings136 where an
employee who was called in for an interview with his supervisor refused to
attend without a coworker witness present. 137
In deciding that the Board's interpretation of the Act was permissible, the
court observed that Weingarten did not expressly limit its holding to a union
setting.' 38 The Third Circuit listed several reasons to support its conclusion.
First, the employee's request for the presence of a coworker "builds solidar-
ity and vigilance among employees in the absence of a union no differently
than it does where a collective bargaining representative has been recog-
nized."' 139 Second, the application of Weingarten in a nonunion setting ne-
gates any inequality in the bargaining power that may exist between
employees and the employer."4 The court noted that the presence of a co-
worker may lead to a more efficient handling of the dispute and may help the
parties to settle the dispute on an informal basis.' 4 '
Addressing the Ninth Circuit's decision in Du Pont I, the Third Circuit
concluded that the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Weingarten was "fore-
closed by the Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of Section 7 in the
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1077 n.L
134. Du Pont I, 724 F. Supp. at 1061. Following a petition for rehearing by Du Pont, the
court granted a panel rehearing and remanded the case to the Board for reconsideration. In
light of the Sears decision the Board found that the employee's refusal to submit to the inter-
view was not protected activity. See E.I. Du Pont de Nemours, 274 N.L.R.B. No. 176 (1985).
135. Du Pont , 724 F.2d at 1061.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1063.
138. Id. at 1065-66. The Third Circuit noted that the Weingarten Court was aware that its
decision would be extended to a nonunion setting, and had the Court meant to limit its opinion
to an organized situation, it would have clearly expressed this intention.
139. Id. at 1066. The court added "[s]uch voluntary action by one worker on behalf of
another may stimulate others to follow the example, thereby establishing a matrix of mutual
support and assistance." Id.
140. Id. The court reasoned that the worker's perception of any inequality may be height-
ened when no union is present, and the risk of employer misconduct may also be accentuated.
Id.
141. Id.
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Weingarten opinion itself."' 42 Indeed, the court reasoned that under the
Weingarten analysis, the proper focus for determining whether the require-
ment of concertedness is satisfied should be on the "literal nature" of the
activity that would occur if the employee's request was granted. '
4 3
C. The Effect of Section 9 on the Concerted Activity
Requirement of Section 7
One final difficulty in determining the scope of section 7 involves balanc-
ing the concerted activity requirement against other provisions of the Act.
In particular, section 9,1" which confers on the union the exclusive right to
represent employees on terms and conditions of employment, has been
weighed against section 7 in several decisions. 14' For example, in Emporium
Capwell, Co. v. Western Community Organization, 146 the Supreme Court
concluded that the concerted actions of unionized workers may be denied
the section 7 protection which they might otherwise have obtained when
such activity contravenes the union's role as the exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative for all unit employees. 14 7 Accordingly, the Court found that the
exclusivity principles in section 9 should prevail over section 7 to ensure the
continued strength of the collective bargaining unit.
14
Several courts have distinguished Emporium Capwell in circumstances
where the protesting employee's activity is not an attempt to undermine or
bypass the union's domain. 149 In Dreis & Krump Manufacturing Co. v.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1066.
144. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
145. See Emporium Capwell v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 61-65
(1975); Moore v. Sunbeam Corp., 459 F.2d 811, 817 (7th Cir. 1972) (employee's independent
efforts to resolve dispute with employer were in violation of no-strike agreement and without
union support); United Parcel Serv., 205 N.L.R.B. 991, 991 n.1 (1973) (picketing employees
acting in contravention of established grievance procedure were not protected by § 7).
146. 420 U.S. at 50. In Emporium Capwell organized employees engaged in picketing to
force the employer to deal with them and not with the union over the issue of racial discrimi-
nation. The Supreme Court found that the employer did not violate the Act by discharging
the employees because, although § 7 guarantees employees the right to engage in "concerted
activity," this right cannot be pursued in contravention of § 9 which recognizes the union's
status as exclusive bargaining representative.
147. 420 U.S. at 70.
148. Id. at 69-70.
149. See Richardson Paint Co. v. NLRB, 574 F.2d 1195, 1205-06 (5th Cir. 1978) (em-
ployee engaging in concerted activity when peacefully passing out petition during nonwork-
time to protest coworker's layoff); Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 544 F.2d at 327 (employee
distributing leaflets derogatory of employer held lawful where employee had previously filed a
grievance and was pursuing it); NLRB v. Lasaponara & Sons, Inc., 541 F.2d 992, 998-99 (2d
Cir. 1976) (one day work stoppage by employees was protected concerted activity absent any
evidence of group acting contrary to union's advice), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 914 (1977); but see
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NLRB, 15 0 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held
that an employee was unlawfully discharged for distributing leaflets to fellow
workers that were critical of the employer.15' Noting that the employee had
a grievance pending against the employer,' 52 the court found that the em-
ployee's activity was an attempt to complement and not circumvent the
union's activity. 153 Moreover, the critical inquiry, according to the court,
was whether the purpose of the employee's activity was within the contem-
plation of section 7.154
Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in
East Chicago Rehabilitation Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 155 found that a spontane-
ous and unorganized walkout by several employees at a nursing home to
protest unilateral changes in terms of employment was protected under sec-
tion 7.156 Unlike the situation in Emporium Capwell, the court found that
the collective activity in East Chicago was not engaged in to circumvent the
bargaining process but was an example of concerted activity which was cov-
ered under the Act.' 57 The Seventh Circuit stated that in East Chicago, the
workers were not trying to force the employer to bargain with them directly
but were instead protesting the employer's unilateral changes.' 58 Their ac-
tions, the court indicated, were "but an instance of what section 7 protects
under the rubric of 'other concerted activities for the purpose of ... mutual
aid or protection.' "' The court concluded that section 9 only qualifies the
portion of section 7 that assures workers the right to bargain collectively; it
does not, however, impede or infringe upon an employee's section 7 right to
NLRB v. Wilson Freight Co., 604 F.2d 712, 725 n.17 (1st Cir. 1979) (employee complaints in
opposition of positions taken by the union itself not entitled to § 7 protection).
150. 544 F.2d 320 (7th Cir. 1976).
151. Id. at 323-24.
152. Id. at 326.
153. Id. at 327.
154. Id. The Seventh Circuit found that the employee's purpose in distributing the leaflets
was to notify fellow employees of alleged supervisory deficiencies. The court found the em-
ployee's purpose to be clearly for " 'mutual aid or protection' of the employees" regardless of
the fact that the employee acted alone. Id.
155. 710 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1065 (1984).
156. Id. at 400. The Seventh Circuit distinguished the facts in this case from the circum-
stances in Emporium Capwell. It noted that unlike Emporium, the workers here were not
dissatisfied with the union or attempting to circumvent the bargaining agreement. Rather, the
court stated, the employees were merely expressing their anger at the employer's unilateral
change in work rules. Id.
157. Id. at 400-01. The court stated that unless the purpose of the wildcat strike is to assert
a right to bargain collectively in place of the union or to limit the union's bargaining power § 9
does not render strikers unprotected under § 7. Id.
158. Id. at 400.
159. Id.
1986] 1053
Catholic University Law Review
participate in concerted activity for mutual aid and protection.' 6°
III. RESTRICTING THE SCOPE OF SECTION 7 PROTECTION: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE BOARD'S DECISION IN SEARS,
ROEBUCK & Co.
In reaching the conclusion that unorganized workers are not entitled to
the presence of a coworker witness at an employer-conducted interview, the
Board in Sears set forth two main arguments. 16' First, the Board found that
in a unionized setting the Weingarten rule is consistent with section 9 be-
cause an employer seeking to take action against an employee must recog-
nize the union's representational rights and cannot compel the employee to
meet on an individual basis.' 62 In agreement with former Chairman Van de
Water's dissenting opinion in Materials Research, the Board asserted that
protected section 7 rights are limited by the principles of exclusive represen-
tation established in section 9 of the Act.
163
Second, the Board reasoned that the Weingarten representative who may
speak on behalf of the employee and make proposals during the investiga-
tory interview functions much like a union representative.' 64 As a result, the
employees receive the benefit of a collective bargaining agreement without
having selected a union as their authorized bargaining representative.
65
The Board found that this too contravened the Act's exclusivity principle.' 
66
In the first argument, the Board ignores one of the basic principles enunci-
ated in Weingarten-the representative's role of protecting not only the lone
employee, but the entire bargaining unit as well against unjust employer dis-
crimination. 6 7 In narrowly interpreting Weingarten, the Board found this
principle applicable only in a unionized setting. 168 In reality, however, the
need for the presence of a coworker in a nonunion setting may be even more
pressing because the imbalance in power and the risk of employer intimida-
tion is often greater. 1
69
Further, the Board overlooks the limitations on the right, as stated by the
Weingarten Court, which involve certain acts or omissions on the part of
160. Id. at 402.
161. 118 L.R.R.M. at 1330-31.
162. Id. at 1330.
163. Id. For a discussion of Van de Water's dissenting opinion, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 117-26.
164. 118 L.R.R.M. at 1331.
165. Id. at 1330.
166. Id. at 1331.
167. Id. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
168. 118 L.R.R.M. at 1330.
169. See DuPont I. 724 F.2d at 1066.
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both the employer and the employee.' 70 For example, the right to represen-
tation is not automatic. In order for the right to be activated the employee
must request the presence of a witness.17' Once the request is made, the
employer may refuse the request and discontinue the interview at once. 172
Moreover, the employer is under no obligation to explain his reasons for
denying the request and the interview can still take place without a coem-
ployee witness present if the employee chooses to participate on his own.'73
In other words, employer prerogative determines whether Weingarten rights
will be extended to the employee. '7' Thus, the Weingarten right is not guar-
anteed in all circumstances; rather, it is a conditional privilege subject to the
employer's consent.'
Moreover, the Board's reliance on the section 9 principles enunciated in
Emporium Capwell176 is erroneous. Section 9 deals with the rights of em-
ployers and employees to resolve disputes, directly and independent of any
involvement by the designated collective bargaining representative, 77 with-
out the employer being held liable for breach of a duty to bargain with the
union under section 8(a)(5) of the Act. 17 8 In Emporium Capwell, section 9
was relevant since there was a union present that the protesting employees
purposely bypassed in an attempt to deal with the employer directly.' 79 Un-
170. See 420 U.S. at 61-70.
171. See supra text accompanying note 85.
172. See supra text accompanying note 88.
173. See supra text accompanying note 89.
174. See supra text accompanying note 88.
175. See supra note 89.
176. See 420 U.S. at 61.
177. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
178. National Labor Relations Act § 9(a). As codified, this provision states that:
[r]epresentatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by
the majority of the employees . . . shall be the exclusive representatives of all the
employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining ... [p]rovided, that
any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any time to
present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without
the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not
inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract.
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982). See also Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 61 n. 12 ("[tihe intendment
of the proviso is to permit employees to present grievances and to authorize the employer to
entertain them without opening itself to liability for dealing directly with employees in deroga-
tion of the duty to bargain only with the exclusive bargaining representative, a violation of
§ 8(a)(5)"); Black-Clawson Co., 313 F.2d at 185 ("section 9(a) merely set[s] up a buffer be-
tween the employee and his union, 'permitting' the employee to take his grievances to the
employer, and 'authorizing' the employer to hear and adjust them without running afoul of the
.exclusive bargaining representative' language of the operative portion of section 9(a)" (foot-
note omitted)).
179. 420 U.S. at 56.
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like Emporium Capwell there was no certified union involved in Sears. 180
Thus, the employee's request for the presence of a coemployee witness would
not present the same dilemma.
Despite the factual distinction in Emporium Capwell and Sears, there is no
language in section 9 that explicitly expands or limits the section 7 rights.' 8
Rather, as the Seventh Circuit found in East Chicago, section 9 clarifies the
section 7 right to bargain collectively.' 82 This argument is buttressed by the
fact that, by its own provisions, the Act precludes any interference with cer-
tain concerted activities such as the right to participate in a strike.' 83 There-
fore, while section 9 affects some section 7 rights of organized employees, it
does not restrict the scope of section 7 protection afforded to unorganized
workers.
The most fundamental distinction, however, between Emporium Capwell
and Sears rests on the Supreme Court's holding that, in a Weingarten set-
ting, there is no duty on the part of the employer to bargain with the repre-
sentative.184 Accordingly, Emporium is irrelevant to the outcome of Sears
since the controversy in the latter has nothing to do with collective
bargaining.
In the same sense, the second assertion by the Board that the representa-
tive functions as a collective bargaining agent conflicts with the contours and
limits imposed by the Weingarten Court.'85 The right to representation was
extended as a function of the section 7 "concerted activities for ... mutual
aid or protection" requirement and not as a function of the section 7 right to
bargain through a union representative.18 6 Moreover, the Weingarten repre-
sentative's duties are not those of a traditional bargaining representative.'
18 7
A union agent may not do any more in an interview than a coemployee
witness.' 88 Thus, a fellow employee could serve as a Weingarten representa-
tive as well as an officially designated union representative.
Similarly, the representative's presence, as noted in Weingarten and
Materials Research, may in fact lead to a more efficient and speedy resolu-
180. 118 L.R.R.M. at 1329.
181. See ARO, Inc., 596 F.2d at 719; Gorman & Finkin, supra note 34, at 357.
182. 710 F.2d at 400. See supra text accompanying note 160.
183. Section 13 provides that "[n]othing in this subchapter, except as specifically provided
for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way
the right to strike." National Labor Relations Act § 13 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 163 (1982)).
184. See Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 259-60.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 83-90.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 76-77.
187. 420 U.S. at 260.
188. See Illinois Bell, 251 N.L.R.B. at 934.
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tion of the problems that would, in turn, minimize any detrimental effects on
the employer's production activities.' 8 9 Additionally, as the Weingarten
Court emphasized, the employer is under no duty to bargain with the union
representative and may insist on hearing the employee's own version of the
incident under investigation.' 90 More importantly, however, the employer
has the power to limit the representative's involvement in the interview with-
out explanation or consideration of the employee's rights.
191
In light of the Board's misplaced reliance on Emporium Capwell, the anal-
ysis in Sears should focus on whether or not the lone employee's request for
assistance is concerted activity. In this regard, the Mushroom Transporta-
tion court recognized that collective action begins with communication be-
tween individuals.' 92 Accordingly, the individual's activity in Sears would
be protected because the employee's conversation met the standard as set
forth in Mushroom Transportation of "mere talk ... looking toward group
action." 
19 3
In contrast to the broad test adopted in Mushroom Transportation, the
Ninth Circuit in Du Pont I set forth a narrow interpretation of section 7,
thereby limiting the application of Weingarten in the unorganized setting.' 94
Under the Du Pont I standard, the court would require a backdrop of group
activity before extending Weingarten rights to a nonunion employee.'95
Consequently, an employer's denial of an employee's request for representa-
tion at an investigatory interview would effectively curtail any effort by the
employee to enlist the support of coworkers.
Nevertheless, the Meyers test, which like Du Pont I presented an overly
restrictive interpretation of section 7, was viewed by Board Member Dennis
as encompassing an employee's request for a coworker witness in Sears. 196
In Dennis' view, the request "is an attempt to initiate concerted activity be-
189. 420 U.S. at 263; Materials Research, 262 N.L.R.B. at 1015; see Du Pont II, 724 F.2d
at 1065-66.
190. 420 U.S. at 260.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 87-90.
192. 330 F.2d at 685. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
193. 330 F.2d at 685. See supra text accompanying notes 38-40. In Sears, Ward sought the
presence of a coworker witness to accompany him during his interview. Under the expansive
Mushroom Transportation test, Ward's conversations would constitute concerted activity since
he was attempting to initiate group activity. Moreover, the fact that no collective action came
as a result of his demands is not determinative since, according to the Mushroom Transporta-
tion court, "it would come very near to nullifying the rights of organization and collective
bargaining guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act if such communications are denied protection
because of lack of fruition." 330 F.2d at 685.
194. See supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
195. Du Pont I, 707 F.2d at 1079. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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cause, if successful, two employees would together confront the employer as
it considered whether to impose discipline." '97
The impact of Interboro and other decisions that derive protection for a
lone employee's activities from existing collective bargaining agreements will
become clearer when the effect of Prill is considered in future decisions. It
appears from City Disposal, however, that the Supreme Court's concern for
equality in employee and employer relations necessitates that the Board ap-
ply a broader interpretation of concerted activity. 98
In this regard, the question of whether concerted activity must be literally
construed to require more than one employee has been answered in the nega-
tive by the Supreme Court in City Disposal. Therefore, a lone employee's
request for assistance arguably constitutes concerted activity. Although the
existence of a collective bargaining agreement creates a presumption of col-
lective action, in Sears the nonunion employee's request for a coworker wit-
ness may in itself be an example of employees seeking to act together. 99
Likewise, the employee's request represents activity for mutual aid or pro-
tection as all employees are assured that, in similar circumstances, they too
can seek the assistance of a coworker. By limiting Weingarten to the organ-
ized setting, nonunion workers would be unable to gain the collective
strength necessary to protect against unfair acts by the employer. Inequality
in bargaining power would be greater in the nonunion setting. This is a
result that is clearly in contravention of the Act.2° Such disparate treat-
ment might conceivably force nonunion workers to affiliate with unions in-
voluntarily in order to gain equal treatment in the workplace.
The Weingarten Court stressed the importance of the right to representa-
tion at an investigatory interview as a means of reducing the inequality in
bargaining power between labor and management. 20  Therefore, national
labor policy mandates the extension of Weingarten to a nonunion setting in
order to effectively minimize the disparities in the workplace that the Act
seeks to eliminate.2 °2
197. 118 L.R.R.M. at 1330 n.8. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
200. 420 U.S. at 261-62.
201. Id. See supra notes 115, 142, and accompanying text.
202. Recently, the third circuit directed the Board to reconsider its ruling that an employee
in an unrepresented setting was lawfully discharged for refusing to submit to an investigatory
interview unless a fellow employee was present. The court observed that the Board's dismissal
of the complaint was premised on the erroneous view that a refusal to extend Weingarten to
nonunion employees was compelled by the Act. The court now views it permissible in some
circumstances to interpret § 7 as guaranteeing union and nonunion employees alike the right
to have a representative present at an investigatory interview. However, the court also held
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Accordingly, the employee's request in Sears represented protected con-
certed activity despite the absence of a union. Underlying this argument,
however, is the fact that the employer may deny the employee's request and
continue the investigation without the employee.2 °3 Consequently, any par-
tial benefits resulting from the employee's concerted activity may be limited
by the actions of the employer. Despite the ultimate limitations that may
exist on the "fruits" of the employee's concerted action, limits should not be
imposed on the right to engage in this activity.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Sears, the Board imposed limitations on an employee's right to engage
in section 7 concerted activity based on the individual's representational sta-
tus. Consequently, unorganized workers were denied rights afforded to their
organized counterparts, thereby allowing opportunity for an imbalance in
employee and employer bargaining power to perpetuate in the workplace.
The Supreme Court in Weingarten clearly stressed the need to protect em-
ployees in situations where the possibility of unjust employer action may
exist. Sears thwarts this goal, however, by restricting the scope of section 7
based on the exclusivity principles set forth in section 9. Although section 9
should not be underestimated, it should not outweigh the protections guar-
anteed under section 7. Without section 7 employees would be unable to
engage in concerted activity, including joining and forming unions, without
the fear of employer reprisal.
In this respect, the Weingarten right to representation at an investigatory
interview cannot be limited to the organized settirg. An employee's request
for the presence of a coworker witness constitutes an attempt to engage in
concerted activity, albeit in its most formative stage. National labor policy
necessitates that this attempt at collective action be protected under a
broader interpretation of the section 7 concerted activity requirement. In
this light, it is apparent that the Board should reassess its current direction
and promote equality in labor-management relations in all work settings.
Jill D. Flack
open the possibility that the Board's position in Sears was a permissible interpretation of the
Act. See Slaughter v. NLRB, 794 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1986).
203. 420 U.S. at 258. See supra text accompanying notes 88-89.
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